How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball'

Five officials from Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, or BND, have revealed that the information gathered from their prisoner, an Iraqi defector code-named Curveball, was exaggerated by President Bush and Colin Powell.

Summary:

• The German intelligence officials responsible for one of the most important informants on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass destruction say that the Bush administration and the CIA repeatedly exaggerated his claims during the run-up to the war in Iraq.
• "He is not a stable, psychologically stable guy," said a BND official who supervised the case.
• Curveball was the chief source of inaccurate prewar U.S. accusations that Baghdad had biological weapons, a commission appointed by Bush reported this year.
• Curveball said he hated Americans, the Germans explained.
• As a result, the DIA --- like the BND --- never tried to check Curveball's background or verify his accounts before sending reports to other U.S. intelligence agencies.
• Moreover, Curveball was "very emotional, very excitable," the doctor told one colleague.
• And although it was early morning, Curveball smelled of liquor and looked "very sick" from a stiff hangover.
• "He was between two worlds, sometimes cooperative, sometimes aggressive," said the BND supervisor.
• MI6 cabled the CIA that British intelligence "is not convinced that Curveball is a wholly reliable source" and that "elements of [his] behavior strike us as typical of ...
• Despite the lack of access or any new reports from Curveball, U.S. intelligence sharply upgraded its assessments of Iraq's biological weapons before the war.
• In March 2004, Killip quit, protesting that the CIA was covering up the truth.
• Rod Barton, an Australian intelligence officer and another bio-weapons expert, also quit over what he said was the CIA's refusal to admit error.
• "Of course the trailers had nothing to do with Curveball," Barton wrote in a recent e-mail.
• After U.S troops failed to find illicit Iraqi weapons in the days and weeks after the invasion, the CIA created the Iraq Survey Group to conduct a methodical search in June 2003.

Source:Counter Think

Bob Drogin and John Goetz, special to The L.A. Times writes:

The German intelligence officials responsible for one of the most important informants on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass destruction say that the Bush administration and the CIA repeatedly exaggerated his claims during the run-up to the war in Iraq.

Five senior officials from Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, or BND, said in interviews with The Times that they warned U.S. intelligence authorities that the source, an Iraqi defector code-named Curveball, never claimed to produce germ weapons and never saw anyone else do so.

I know this is an old article. Counterthink posted an excellent point by point summary, so I wanted to post it and point you to a good website while I was at it.

How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball' - Los Angeles Times